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The Noneconomic Costs of Financial
Crises
John Crawford*
A common theme in the literature on financial regulation is that
the costs of crises must be weighed against the costs of onerous
regulation.' (After all, if debt were outlawed, there would be no crises,
but neither would there be much growth.) This conceptual approach is
generally framed in purely economic terms. 2 There are, however, at
least two types of costs generated by financial crises that are not well
captured by economic variables and that argue in favor of placing a
thumb on the scale in favor of crisis prevention.
First are the psychic costs borne by people directly affected by a
crisis.3 At first glance, this may not appear to add much to the economic
analysis: after all, if there is a trade off between economic growth and
crisis prevention, 4 then the psychic costs to one group of people from a
crisis should be weighed against the psychic gains to others from higher
growth.5 Gains and losses do not, however, perfectly offset each other in
this context: humans tend to weigh losses more heavily than equivalent
* Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law. I am grateful to
Andrew Tuch for helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON'T SEE
THEM COMING 177 (2012) (arguing that "[w]e could design a financial system that avoids crises,
for a period of time at least, but the design faces the problem of risking a crisis on the one hand or
being financially repressive on the other").
2. See, e.g., John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies
and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882, 960-63 (2015) (reviewing studies of financial crisis costs, all
expressed in terms of percentage of gross domestic product); but see GORTON, supra note 1, at 171
(listing costs to social well-being among the potential costs of a crisis).
3. GORTON, supra note 1, at 171 (observing "the costs to social well-being" may include
stress or depression due to unemployment . . . and even suicides").
4. Id. at 177 (citing a study finding that "countries that have experienced occasional
financial crises have tended to grow faster than countries that have not experienced crises").
5. See, e.g., FRtDtRIC BASTIAT, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL ECONOMY 1, 1 (George B. de Huszar ed., Seymour Cain trans., Found. for Econ. Educ.
1995) (1848), http://www.econlib.org/library/Bastiat/basEss1.html [https://perma.cc/NAA7-9UFJ]
(observing that "[t]here is only one difference between a bad economist and a good one: the bad
economist confines himself to the visible effect; the good economist takes into account both the
effect that can be seen and those effects that must be foreseen.").
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gains.6 Furthermore, ex post redistribution offers an imperfect solution:
social insurance programs, as important as they are, can be ineffective
in assuaging the blow to one's self-esteem and well-being that often
accompanies the loss of a job or home. (I do not mean to suggest, of
course, that job loss and foreclosures can be eliminated in a healthy
economy; my focus here is on the narrow question of how we should
weigh various costs in designing a financial regulatory system.)
The second cost that is not well captured by economic variables
is the damage a crisis can wreak on public confidence in key societal
institutions. Such damage likely correlates strongly with wreckage to
the real economy; as Jonathan Rauch argued recently in The Atlantic,
"[s]ome of what always looked like unconditional support for democracy
[in Europe and North America] may actually have been conditioned on
rising prosperity."7 Of course, if economic prosperity is what matters,
and if both crises and regulation meant to prevent crises can harm
economic growth, then the political costs involved in striking the
appropriate regulatory balance would seem to mirror the economic costs
precisely. But the point made above about the asymmetry of the psychic
impact of losses and gains 8 suggests that crises could undermine public
faith in key institutions more than slower (but steady) growth coupled
with fewer crises, even if total long-run economic output was equivalent
in the two cases. In other words, higher psychic costs could generate
higher civic costs.
Of course, regulators can limit the economic damage from a
crisis, but this usually requires protecting financial firms or their
6. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 282 (2011) (describing the
phenomenon of loss aversion).
7. Jonathan Rauch, Containing Trump, ATLANTIC, Mar. 2017,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/03/containing-trump/5 13854/
[https://perma.cc/4TD6-SESR]; see also Jon Hilsenrath & Bob Davis, Election 2016Is Propelled by
the American Economy's Failed Promises, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2016, 12:39 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/election-2016-is-propelled-by-the-american-economys-failed-
promises-1467909580 [https://perma.cc/RLF2-UAHQ] (arguing that the period since 2000 "has
proved so turbulent and disappointing it has upended basic assumptions about modern economics
and the political system"). The financial crisis was obviously not the only cause of economic woes
over the past two decades, but its contribution should not be underestimated. See, e.g., Martin
Wolf, The Long and Painful Journey to World Disorder, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/efl3e6la-ccec-11e6-b8ce-b9cO3770f8b1 [https://perma.cc/L9JX-X3GM]
(arguing that the financial crisis and subsequent Eurozone crisis "had devastating economic
effects" and that the "economies of the advanced countries are roughly a sixth smaller today than
they would have been if pre-crisis trends had continued").
8. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. The argument here ignores important
distributional concerns, though my suspicion is that such concerns would bolster the case for crisis
prevention (as would be true, for example, if financial crises hurt the less well-off more than lax
regulation helps them).
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creditors, which may exacerbate the public's anger.9 Former Treasury
Secretary Tim Geithner captures this problem in what he calls "the
central paradox of financial crises": "What feels just and fair is often the
opposite of what's required for a just and fair outcome. It's why
policymakers generally tend to make crises worse, and why the politics
of crisis management are always untenable."10
In any event, to the degree that economic losses create psychic
harms and fuel discontent with liberal democracy in ways that foregone
gains of a comparable dollar amount do not, it should lead us to place
even greater emphasis on efforts to "panic proof' the system. Accepting
this diagnosis does not, alas, yield immediately obvious or
uncontroversial policy prescriptions. This is in part because the very
tools regulators need to halt a financial panic, such as emergency
lending and guarantee authorities, may also create moral hazard,
thereby increasing the probability of a crisis. This tension led to a sort
of schizophrenia in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act as Congress gave regulators some new panic-prevention
tools" while stripping them of others. 1 2
Is there a way out of this dilemma? The answer, I believe, lies in
trying to recapture the conditions that produced the panic-free, seventy-
five-year stretch that Gary Gorton has dubbed the "Quiet Period." 1 3
Such an approach would require limiting the areas of the financial
system in which vulnerable funding structures make panics possible,
as well as recognizing that market discipline cannot, by itself, prevent
crises. The first step1 4 is to understand what a financial crisis is: it is
not (merely) an asset bubble bursting, but rather the widespread
withdrawal of short-term debt funding. 15 Step two is to recognize that
short-term debt serves as the functional equivalent of bank deposits.16
9. See, e.g., Adam Nagourney, Bracing for a Backlash Over Wall Street Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 15, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/us/politics/16assess.html
[https://perma.cc/ATGS-KSEG] (noting administration concern "about a populist backlash against
banks and Wall Street, [and] worr[y] that anger at financial institutions could also end up being
directed at Congress and the White House . . . .").
10. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 505 (2014).
11. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, tit. II, 124 Stat. 1376, 1442-1520 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5384 (2012))
(providing regulators with the authority to wind down systemically important financial firms
outside of bankruptcy).
12. See, e.g., id. § 1106, 124 Stat. at 2125 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 5611 (2012))
(eliminating the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's free-standing authority to a widely
available debt guarantee program).
13. See GORTON, supra note 1, at 4.
14. The "answer" adumbrated here is the one set forth in MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY
PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016).
15. Id. at ch. 4.
16. Id. at ch. 2.
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Step three is to enforce in functional terms the prohibition on nonbanks
issuing deposits.17 This means, in practical terms, stamping out
"shadow banking." Step four is to bolster government backing of bank
deposits. 18 Step five is to strengthen regulation to address heightened
moral hazard problems-for example, by charging appropriate risk
premiums to banks for deposit insurance.19 The economic argument for
this approach is persuasive; the political argument-helping maintain
citizens' faith in central societal institutions-makes it compelling. An
important goal of those thinking and writing about financial regulation
in the coming years should be to shift the Overton window 20 to make
these reforms politically tractable.
17. Id. at ch. 9.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The Overton window, or the "window of discourse, is the range of ideas the public will
accept." Overton Window, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overton-window
[https://perma.cc/5KC4-BLNK] (last updated June 9, 2017).
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